Don't forget Bangladesh: Why BJP's Bengal win provides a new opening to rebuild ties

In all the euphoria over the BJP’s massive win in West Bengal, the Modi government should not forget that good ties with Bangladesh are important. It’s not that New Delhi has been asleep at the wheel. Well before the West Bengal results were out, it had chosen Dinesh Trivedi – a politician – as its new envoy to Dhaka, signalling that ties with that country will be parsed through the political prism as well.

After the disastrous tenure of Mohammad Yunus, who was at the helm as chief advisor to the interim government, the elections last February brought in a new majority government headed by Tarique Rahman of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. From all indications, Rahman wants to improve ties with India, a country that surrounds it on three sides. Any improvement in Bangladesh’s economic situation depends on cooperation with India. Anti-India elements believe they can also tap American and Chinese investments for growth, but geography says something else.

It is in India’s interests to seek to improve ties, and prevent outside powers from being able to build anti-India constituencies inside Bangladesh. The main opposition to Rahman in Bangladesh comes from the Jamaat-e-Islami, a hardline Islamist political party that played a key role in the genocide of Hindus just before the 1971 war that liberated Bangladesh. In a 297-seat assembly, the Jamaat-led front won 68 seats, 51 of which were close to the India-Bangladesh border.

In terms of challenges to both India and the BNP-led Bangladesh government, the Jamaat could be seen as a common threat. If there is any kind of resistance to the fencing on the border and deportation of illegal Bangladeshis from India, the Jamaat will probably lead this charge.

India must thus lose no time to build bridges with Bangladesh, even though it cannot abandon its own security interests that involve border fencing and strengthening the Siliguri “chicken’s neck” corridor which is the main land access to the whole of the north-east.

With the exit of the Trinamool Congress from power in West Bengal, the main impediment to India’s own efforts to strengthen security along the 2,217-km-long border with Bangladesh in this state, is now gone. Mamata Banerjee’s dependence on a Muslim vote bank that lives on both sides of the border made her lack of cooperation on security issues almost anti-national in effect. Now, with the BJP government in place, that block is gone. With Assam and Tripura also hosting BJP governments, most of the Bangladesh border is now manageable not only by building fences, but also through the use of smart technologies involving drones, radars, powerful cameras and other detection devices.

What can be the basis of a new rapprochement with Bangladesh, where Hindus may continue to feel threatened by Islamist parties, and where illegal migration and cattle smuggling will continue along the porous borders?

There can be five pegs on which to build the relationship, at least to the level it was at during Sheikh Hasina’s regime.

First, India can promise investments in Bangladesh and also foreign exchange support when needed.

Second, India can offer to buy Bangladeshi energy supplies in return for delivering power to that country. An Adani power plant in Jharkhand exists only for this purpose.

Third, Bangladesh, for its part, must offer to cooperate in taking back its own nationals staying illegally in India. For this we need a mechanism to verify the Bangladeshi citizenship of the people to be deported. India, to make it palatable, can offer to allow these Bangladeshi nationals (once they are identified as such) to work in India for, say, 2-3 years more, after which they must return. We could also extend this arrangement to work visas at a later date, provided there is no expectation of Indian citizenship by naturalisation.

Four, the Teesta water sharing agreement can be finalised with some compromises on both sides. Mamata Banerjee was the sole politician responsible for sabotaging this agreement, though there are sensitivities in north Bengal on this issue, which must be handled.

Fifth, both sides must agree to let the fence come up in order to prevent illegal crossings of people and cattle. But this is as much a challenge for India as Bangladesh. Hindus have this belief in protecting cows, but they are unwilling to pay for their upkeep once they stop providing milk and the animal becomes an economic burden. The illegal cattle trade was built on this economic logic, where old cattle could be sold and shipped across the border for slaughter without Hindus having this on their conscience. The business also allowed cattle smugglers to use the money for more nefarious activities, but that is something both countries can agree on. As they can on the prevention of drug smuggling across the southern districts of West Bengal.

Sixth, the issue of visas for Bangladeshis seeking medical treatment in India should be offered as a no strings attached initial trust-building move.

It is in both India’s and Bangladesh’s interest to recreate a working relationship first, and then broaden it into an economic partnership where trade is free to flow on both sides.

India must seek a better relationship with Bangladesh to prevent the insertion of foreign forces that are inimical to India. Bangladesh needs a stable relationship with India for its own economic progress. India’s north-east will benefit, and so will all parts of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has a choice: to become the new Pakistan with overt external dependence, or a true sovereign which works for its own interests.