A cautious case for reopening engagement with Pakistan

India’s Pakistan strategy needs a rethink, with some kind of engagement becoming more necessary in a world where all rules are being broken. Currently, our policy towards this terror-sponsoring state rests on two formally stated pillars: one holds that terror and talks cannot go hand in hand; and the second, enunciated after Operation Sindoor by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in mid-2025, holds that any act of terror will be treated as an “act of war”.

A third pillar, that no third party can seek to mediate between India and Pakistan, is the national consensus. But with Donald Trump shouting from the rooftops that he mediated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May 2025, and, more recently, with China claiming the same thing, the Modi government has been forced on the defensive. While strenuously denying any third party role in ending the four-day conflict, the claims by Trump and China cannot be wished away. While neither the US nor China may have actually “mediated” a ceasefire, one cannot rule out some kind of back-channel moves facilitated by the US, though this is unlikely in the case of China, which actively aided Pakistan with real-time intelligence during the war. An indirect participant in the war could not have mediated anything, unless this happened through some kind of covert “threat” to India from the Chinese end. Maybe the Chinese involvement itself forced India to avoid an extended conflict.

There is also a fundamental contradiction in the Indian position on Pakistan. You can’t say there will be no third party involvement in any conflict or detente while at the same time emphasising that there can be no talks while terrorism continues. No direct talks means third parties can get into the picture indirectly whether we like it or not. 

Also, while the no-talks-till-terrorism-ends stance goes down well with the domestic audience, this has not been a consistent view when it comes to talks with other troublesome neighbours. Bangladesh is becoming another Pakistan by courting extremist groups (and it has already made threatening noises about India’s chicken’s neck and the north-east), and China is an ever-present threat to our security, but we continue to engage with both of them. 

So engaging Pakistan at some level or the other is probably needed in the coming years, which then poses the next question: what exactly do we talk about, when there is no likelihood of Pakistan abandoning terrorism or its efforts to keep the Kashmir and Khalistan issues festering from its side of the border? Didn’t every effort from our side, from Atal Behari Vajpayee’s Lahore trip to Narendra Modi’s grand bid to make up by inviting Nawaz Sharif to his 2014 inauguration, fail? Aman ki aasha, candlelight vigils on the Wagah border, and visits and contracts for Pakistani artistes in Bollywood and Indian music events have not made the Pakistani establishment any more amenable to peace overtures. In fact, cultural exchanges have been largely in one direction - from Pakistan to India.

So what exactly is there to talk about? And who do you talk to? The civilian government, or the army, or both?

The last question is easiest to answer, for it has always been part of India’s policy to deal with whoever is in power. Whether it is Myanmar or Bangladesh or anywhere else, or even the mullahs of Afghanistan or Iran, we have dealt with the persons in power. So there is no need to make an exception with Pakistan, and since the implicit power structure there gives the army a role in government, we must talk to both the civilian and army leadership, preferably together, or separately, if that is what they want.

The “what” of engagement is more difficult to define, but let’s start with the most obvious one: if we are going to drop bombs on Pakistan every time there is a significant terror attack (ie, excluding minor incidents), you need direct channels of communication not only with the key people in military operations, but also the civilian leadership, if and when we (or they) want to de-escalate. Otherwise, it will be back to dependence on back-channel methods, as it probably happened with Operation Sindoor. We cannot exclude third party interventions if we do not have direct lines of communication with Pakistani decision-makers, whether in the army or in the civilian government, or in the national security establishment. So NSAs and army departments and the Prime Minister’s offices in both countries must have direct lines of communication open at all times to discuss and/or de-escalate tensions, as and when they arise.

Second, we can discuss the situation in other parts of the world. Getting briefed on what Pakistan thinks about events in Afghanistan, Iran, West Asia or Europe is not a useless activity. Face-to-face talks allow you to detect unsaid subtexts that formal statement-mongering can never do. It would also be useful to let Pakistan know what we think on these issues too. For example, why not bring up the Uyghur issue in China, just to check what they really think about it. These talks can always be denied, but they can offer useful feedback loops for our policy-makers.  

Third, Pakistan sees Kashmir as disputed territory, and indirectly so do we when we say that the unfinished business of partition is the reclamation of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK). Pakistan does not formally claim any other territory, but it continues to stoke the Khalistan issue. The Pakistanis believe we are indirectly supporting the Balochistan freedom movement. At the very least we can agree to discuss current causes of tension behind closed doors, and without having to put out statements on controversial topics. Anything claimed by the other side can always be denied by us and vice-versa.

Fourth, there is always trade that can be discussed. India’s misfortune is that it is one of the few countries in the world whose biggest neighbour won’t play ball on trade. Most countries trade the most with their neighbours, but in India’s case the biggest neighbour in south Asia is too hostile for its own good. There is scope for increased direct trade instead of having to route all transactions through third countries. At some point, one has to hope that the Pakistani people will want to improve their economic condition, and for this the key is relative peace with India. Having a direct line of dialogue with the army, which plays a significant role in Pakistan’s economy, and where it runs many of its own businesses, can be of use here, though one should not hold one’s breath on forward movement on trade anytime soon.

Fifth, and this dialogue can only take place behind closed doors, with no aides present. Pakistan is over-dependent on China and most Pakistanis probably know that this subverts their own independence. India can impress on them that if they are able to keep their historical animosity towards “Hindu India” in check, they can grow much faster and with more strategic options that will benefit their own people. It is highly unlikely that a proud people will want to play second fiddle to the Chinese, who may be taking Pakistani concurrence on their geopolitical goals for granted. Pakistani debts cannot be repaid without greater growth in trade with the rest of the world, and especially India.

Sixth, there is always the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) to discuss, where Pakistan now has no say in what India does on its side of the border. The treaty is in abeyance, and Pakistan knows that in future, when more run-of-the-river projects and canals get built, its interests will be under threat. The IWT is a bargaining chip we never gave ourselves till now. Now that we have it, why not use it to benefit ourselves?

The short point is this: India needs to reopen engagement with Pakistan at various levels without any kind of romanticised illusions (“we-are-the-same-people”) driving its progress. Every discussion must be about give and take. No one-sided concessions. It is worth trying, even if it does not ultimately succeed in reducing animosities. At worst, we will be no better off than today. The world will know we at least tried, and so will the Pakistani people. And why not give the Bangladeshis something to worry about by talking to Pakistan? If we can talk to Xi Jinping to send a message to Washington, why not do the same by talking to Islamabad or Dhaka separately?

A last point: when a crumbling world order means that there will be no permanent allies or enemies, and all will be frenemies, why make Pakistan the sole exception to this rule? We should never let down our external security preparedness, whether with Pakistan or Bangladesh or China, but we should not fear talking to our eternal enemies.