From NEET/CBSE to JLR and PSLV, our cyber vulnerabilities are outpacing cyber defences; Time to course-correct
Indians demonstrate the correctness of Murphy’s law repeatedly: if something can go wrong, it will. If it, miraculously doesn’t, we will find new ways to screw things up.
While this
is an unflattering view of the average Indian’s (and officialdom’s) chalta-hai
attitude, let us step back and ask a different question: what is the single
thread (apart from our own follies) that may (or may not) connect the NEET
paper leaks, the CBSE exam paper mess (and denial-of-service attacks on the
portal), the sudden appearance of the Cockroach Janta Party a few weeks ago,
the Bangladesh and Nepal street protests of 2024 and 2025 that sent two
incumbent governments packing, the crash of a Tejas aircraft during an airshow
in Dubai last year and the endless delays in the delivery of engines for the
Tejas programme by GE, the death of India’s first Chief of Defence Staff in a
helicopter crash in 2021, and the failure of two PSLV launches - both carrying
critical security and surveillance satellites - in two consecutive years? We
can add to the list the US targeting of Gautam Adani, India’s richest
individual, in an alleged victimless crime (now settled out of court), the short-selling
of Adani stock following a negative report by Hindenburg Research on the group,
followed in due course by the massive general selling of Indian equities by
foreign institutional investors, and the cyber-attack on Jaguar Land Rover (JLR),
the only India-owned car company in the UK. JLR lost millions of pounds
due to this cyber-attack, and one wonders why only an Indian-owned company was
chosen for this honour.
You don’t
have to believe in conspiracy theories too much, but we must acknowledge one
reality: India’s rise will be more contested than the rise of any country, with
both America and China keen to slow it down. We didn’t even need to imagine
this as Christopher Landau, US deputy secretary of state, made it crystal clear
at this year’s Raisina Dialogue. He said in so many words that the US won’t facilitate India’s rise as it does not want to repeat the
mistakes it made with China. Translated, this means the US could do a lot to
impede our rise – as it did by imposing mindless tariffs and secondary
sanctions on India last year under the guise of tackling Russia’s aggression in
Ukraine.
One cannot
speculate where, or in which of the incidents above, foreign parties may have
had an active hand in embarrassing India – though, one must admit, we have an
innate ability to mess things up without any external help – but there is an
unstated linkage here. Even if the US or China had nothing to do with some or
all of these failures, they will at least be secretly happy about it. In any
case, any direct attempt to damage India will be done with the help of third
parties, which gives them plausible deniability. They can then pretend to help
us out of our trouble and force us to compromise in some area or the other.
There is a
novel to be written about how the US Deep State, in a wink-and-a-nod
relationship with China and some of its puppet states (Pakistan comes to mind),
now has a strong reason to actively damage India’s growth story.
I would
begin the novel sometime in 2019, at the basement of the CIA headquarters,
where a deeply anti-India senator, some unnamed deputy directors of the CIA and
FBI, a George Soros or Ford Foundation representative, and a publisher of one
of the big media houses, all gather to discuss India and how it may pose a
future threat to US hegemony. The idea would be to separately and collectively,
with plausible deniability, do what they need to do to undermine India’s growth
story, and, even more specifically, damage the credibility of the Modi
government through subtle information warfare.
Reason: not
only does the US not want India to become a future economic and military
challenger, but its civil society and evangelical organisations are deeply
antagonistic to Hindu India. If not a balkanisation of India, they would like an
enfeebled India, run by a weak coalition government which can easily be
manipulated by various NGOs and arms of the extended US Deep State. The fictional
2019 meeting was prompted by the big Modi win in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections,
which the western media thought was unlikely to result in yet another majority
government, but turned out differently. Now that the third Modi government is a
coalition, the games have begun.
The
consensus in this fictional Deep State strategy meeting would have been the
following:
One, we (the “we” here and below
refer to a hypothetical US Deep State group plotting to undermine India) must cut
the ground from under the Modi government by both creating civil confrontations
on the street, and by backing opposition politicians. The 2019 farm protests,
the anti-CAA agitations, and the anger generated over the current NEET and CBSE
failures are cases in point. These protests do not lack real reasons for street
protests, but they can also be financed and instigated from abroad. Enter
foreign support for all these protests, and the Cockroach Janta Party, to fan
youth unrest.
Two, “we” must arrest India’s military
rise and (if possible) prevent it from becoming too self-sufficient in most high-tech
military hardware, especially in areas like fighter aircraft and engines. The
modernisation of the military and creation of theatre commands was delayed when
the first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Bipin Rawat, was killed in a
helicopter crash in 2021. And even five years later, theatre commands remain on
paper. They are still to be implemented even though another CDS has completed
his term in office. As for expansion of the Tejas fleet, we know that it is the
US that has caused all the delays by holding back on engine deliveries. It is a
big worry that we continue to rely on US GE engines for so critical a
programme.
Three, “we” must interfere with India’s
advancement in frontier technologies. The failures of two critical PSLV
launches could well have been the result of Trojans – in the same way the
Stuxnet was introduced into the Iranian nuclear programme’s systems to delay it.
It is worth recalling that ISRO’s S Nambi Narayanan was arrested in the
1990s on false
charges of spying for Pakistan, when the entire case was probably orchestrated by
external powers in order to delay advances in India’s cryogenic engine
programme with space applications. The PSLV failures fall into the same pattern
of inimical forces seeking to slow down our ability to run our own space-based
surveillance. The possibility of mala fide hacking of the NEET exam papers and
CBSE fiascos cannot be ruled out. But one must also point out that we are
equally capable of shooting ourselves in the foot.
Four, “we” must make the Indian
neighbourhood hot for India so that its focus remains on securing its own internal
security and the neighbourhood. While Pakistan can always be relied on to
remain hostile to India, the challenge is to make Bangladesh and Nepal also
part of the hostile caucus of inimical neighbourhood powers. This is what has partially
come to be, even as the Indian response is yet to be fully formulated.
Five, “we” must use every opportunity to
run down India’s growth story, and help this story stick by shifting western
capital out of India in the medium term.
But here’s
the point: There are enough ingredients in the list of Indian failures or
challenges to make a convincing spy thriller, but we would be wise to treat all
these as our problems, ours to fix, and not the doings of dangerous
friends-cum-foes – though that may well be the case in some areas. The only way
to rise is by fixing our own weaknesses, not blaming others for it.
The first
place to fix things is cyber space. In all those Indian failures mentioned
above, a lot of the damage could have been done through cyber-attacks, and in
some cases, it is obviously so – as it was with the denial-of-service
attacks on the CBSE portal in the last few days.
Indian
infrastructure is too digitally exposed and vulnerable to cyber threats right
now, and this is what we can never allow to fester in the age of artificial
intelligence, and Anthropic’s Mythos, which can (reportedly) expose cyber
vulnerabilities very quickly, leaving little time to build patches to cover the
holes. Many of those failures listed above would have a cyber vulnerability
component, whether it is the exam paper leaks or PSLVs. Time to build our cyber
defences (and offences).
And yes,
building cyber defences must be accompanied by cyber offence capabilities, for
sometimes when the culprit (or country) is known, the only deterrence will be
the ability to strike back.
Our ability
to defend our digital vulnerabilities has been outpaced by our explosive digital
growth. It should be Priority No 1 this year. Maybe, just maybe, we should declare a cyber emergency without causing undue panic.
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